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Abstract. Political corruption represents a specific type of public-to-public corruption which 
implies that one participant of corrupt transaction belongs on the State and the other to the private 
sector: in fact, public corruption is a particular (and, illegal) State-society relationship. Political 
corruption occurs when politicians, who are delegated to make laws and enforce them by the 
citizens, act themselves in a corrupt way. More precisely, it appears when policymakers exploit 




To begin, it is important to define the word ‘corruption’. According to Jain (2001), 
“Corruption is an act in which the power of public office is used for personal gain in a manner that 
contravenes the rules of the game”. Here we are only referring to public-to-public interaction 
and not private-to-private. While public-to-public corruption usually involves a private 
party on one side and public official or member of State on the other, private-to-private 
corruption is any form of illegal transaction between associations or corporations within 
the private sector. When, for example, a director or employee gets involved in practices 
that are not part of his responsibilities and that are detrimental to the company he is 
working for but advantageous for himself or others, this can be defined as private-to-
private corruption: “the type of corruption that occurs when a manager or employee exercises a 
certain power or influence over the performance of a function, task, or responsibility within a 
private organization or corporation” (Argandoña 2003). 
For many years different political scientists have approached the subject of political 
corruption and the difficulty in defining the term. In some cases, certain practices may be 
considered legal (for example certain forms of bribery), consequently making corruption 
appear less prevalent, or occasionally also having the adverse effect (Olken and Pande, 
2011). After, Peters and Welch (1978) explained that “the systematic study of corruption is 
hampered by the lack of an adequate definition” and “What may be ‘corrupt’ to one citizen, 
scholars, or public official is ‘just politics’ to another, or ‘indiscretion’ to a third”, many have 
tried to come up with different ways of solving the problem.  
As we can deduct from Jain’s definition, corruption usually stems from three different 
circumstances – weak institutions, discretionary power and economic rents. 
Firstly, regarding weak institutions, the rewards gained from corruption will always have 
to be more significant than the foreseen payoff from the process of being discovered and 
punished.  Secondly, for corruption to occur, the State member in question must be able to 
control the designation of resources in a discretionary manner. Lastly, it must be possible 
to extract rents or create extractable rents on behalf of the discretionary power. 
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Therefore with regards to public-to-public corruption, as mentioned above there are two 
sides – the State (politicians, bureaucrats, civil servants, officials and anyone who has 
discretionary power over society) and the private party. When politicians (or any State 
members) take advantage of their position to unlawfully obtain resources to their 
advantage (or in favour of others), this is considered to be corrupt practice which is carried 
out on the boundary between public and private environments. 
Business and financial corruption which are widespread and indeed any transactions 
which happen exclusively in the private environment, away from the public sector, will 
not be considered in this voice. 
It is worth identifying what actually constitutes corruption. Some practices are illegal but 
are not actually defined as corruption because they are not linked to political power. These 
include money laundering, fraud, drug smuggling and black market transactions. 
Another important point is the close link between politics and organized crime. 
Furthermore, there is even a new type of ‘business politician’ or ‘entrepreneur’ who 
“combines mediation in (licit or illicit) business transactions, first-hand participation in economic 
activity, and political mediation in the traditional sense” as stated by della Porta and Pizzorno 
(1996). 
There is a specific analysis of corruption, known as the ‘principal-agent analysis’ (Rose-
Ackerman, 1978),  which involves considering three main agents or ‘actors’: the principal 
(the State), the private agent (citizen or company) and an agent (a public official) who in 
theory follows the interests of the principal. If the private party wants to obtain an 
advantage, he pays a bribe to the public official to help him instead of carrying out the 
interests of the principal. This is considered to be corruption. 
Corruption can happen on two levels – bureaucratic and political. Bureaucratic or petty 
corruption is corruption in the public administration where bureaucrats (known as the 
‘actors’) use their public position for financial or non-financial benefits. Political or grand 
corruption, on the other hand, is when politicians are corrupt and use their power for 
illegitimate financial gain and to maintain their political position. They are given the right 
to make decisions and to create laws but they abuse this right in order to satisfy their own 
requirements. 
Since political corruption has many different aspects, it is a difficult task to come up with a 
conclusive definition of the term. The characteristics and objectives of political corruption 
depend on the polity under discussion. Nye (1967) gives this statement about political 
corruption as: “behavior which deviates from the formal duties of a public role (elective or 
appointive) because of private-regarding (personal, close family, private clique) wealth or status 
gains: or violates rules against the exercise of certain types of private-regarding influence”. The 
various forms of political corruption can be recognized and analyzed by using an overall 
definition as a starting point. 
It is worth noting that political and bureaucratic corruption are in fact inextricably linked 
as in the two different spheres their areas of competence can become interchangeable. 
However, for our objectives, the two different forms of corruption should be analyzed in 
practical terms. 
In this encyclopedic voice, the focus is on political corruption, as opposed to general 
corruption, therefore one can concentrate on the political actors and the public 
environment in which they perform.  Political corruption has a complex nature with a 
wide range of aspects which should be outlined. Although an extensive classification of 
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the subject could reduce the analytical study, it is necessary in order to fully understand 
the different forms and characteristics.  
 
Different types of Political Corruption 
Political corruption is not only a question of breach of formal legislations, of code of 
conducts and court rulings, but it also has a deeper impact on the entire political system. It 
can have a negative influence on decision-making, leading to the mishandling of 
procedures and finally the breakdown of political institutions.  
While political corruption involves politicians carrying out illegal practices in order to 
maintain their position and improve their personal situation, it does not include police 
misconduct or suppression of political rivals. It is also important to clarify if the political 
corruption is taking place in democratic nations or dictatorial countries, due to the fact 
that there is lack of accountability between those in power and ‘the people’. There are 
problems with political corruption in dictatorial countries as the legal framework is 
already fragile, making it difficult to assess corruption and often leading to infringement 
by the leaders. Therefore the legal infrastructure of the State cannot be used as a point of 
reference to determine the extent of political corruption. 
While bureaucratic corruption can often be approached by using administrative means 
(auditing, legislation and institutional organization), political corruption with its 
detrimental consequences, needs a much stronger solution. It is necessary to use 
legislative, moral, ethical and political reference points first and foremost to differentiate 
between legality and legitimacy regarding political corruption. 
Major political reforms are essential for fighting local political corruption. In the majority 
of dictatorial countries, political corruption is a routine event. As bureaucratic corruption 
is often rife in these regimes, this encourages political corruption, which obviously varies 
according to the different types of  authoritarianism. Rulers of these countries use corrupt 
means in order to empower themselves and maintain their political status. 
With regard to democracies, political corruption is more of a sporadic and incidental event 
and can therefore often be resolved by means of reforms and reinforcing the political 
framework and institutions of checks and balances.  
Political corruption can be divided into different categories, mainly ‘personal’ and 
‘institutional’ or ‘collective’ corruption. The difference depends on what extent the 
financial (or other) rewards from the corruption are ‘privatised’. While some may share 
the extraction with his associates, others will keep most if not all of the rewards for 
himself. ‘Personal’ corruption is when politicians abuse their status to illegally obtain 
benefits for ‘personal’ gain. A very common example is the acceptance of bribes by 
politicians and giving out benefits in return. On the other hand, ‘collective’ corruption is a 
form of corruption which involves extracting resources for the benefit of a bigger group or 
organization, not just the private individual. Public power is abused for ‘private’ gain, 
which does not necessarily mean for the personal benefits of one person but also for 
‘collective’ gain, for private groups. It is often the ruling parties and/or potential ruling 
parties, national governments and administrative authorities that become involved in this 
form of corruption, using the resources at hand to their own advantage. 
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There is a significant distinction to be made between political corruption and ‘lobbying’ 
when talking about ‘collective corruption’. According to some (Damania et al. 2004, 
Harstad and Svensonn 2011, Campos ad Giovannoni 2007), the definition of ‘corruption’ 
only refers to petty or bureaucratic corruption, whereas any form of practice done to 
influence policy-makers, should be referred to as ‘lobbying’. However, this definition 
cannot be applied to all political systems as it does not distinguish between what is legal 
and what is illegal when influencing policy-makers and does not take into account the 
regulations in all countries. While in the United States, where it is completely legal to 
provide pecuniary payments to policy makers (lobbying) and the definitions of petty 
corruption and lobbying may be applied, in other nations the same payments are regarded 
as illegal and therefore politically corrupt. 
It is worth looking at the procedures used to obtain private gains within the political 
environment in order to distinguish between the different forms of political influence 
(including lobbying) and political corruption. Since political corruption occurs when 
politicians obtain private benefits by means of non-transparent, unofficial procedures, one 
could say that lobbying is a particular form of corruption as it is still a way of gaining 
benefits from public entities or legislative organizations, with favours being given in 
return. However, lobbying and political corruption do have their differences which need 
to be noted. Lobbying is not always a case of bribes and campaign contributions. 
According to Austen-Smith and Wright (1994), lobbyists are capable of influencing 
politicians as they share competences and know-how which some politicians lack. 
Grossman and Helpman (1999 and 2001) mention how some lobbyists even threaten 
politicians by saying they will give voters detrimental information about their policies 
while others sway politicians with endorsements. 
Other two types of corruption are ‘transactive’ and ‘extortive’ corruption. ‘Transactive’ 
corruption is an illegal exchange between a donor and a recipient, where both actors 
benefit. ‘Extortive’ corruption usually involves coercion of some sort so that the donor and 
people he is close to are not hurt in any way. Transactive practices are in theory based on 
reciprocity. It is a transaction between public officials (the State) and private actors 
(society) where both parties benefit from the exchange. In this corrupt exchange there are 
two further distinctions to be made between ‘redistributive corruption’ and ‘extractive 
corruption’. With ‘redistributive corruption’ it is the State who provides the private citizen 
or businessman with the resources, while ‘extractive corruption’ is from the private actor 
to the State. Even though in theory the relationship is a reciprocal one, in reality this is 
rarely the case. In some nations or States in the world, the State plays the weaker role in 
transactions with society. Here redistributive corruption might take place as the mafia is 
rife and prevalent clientelism, which means that the State loses power as these private 
individuals or groups form a corrupt relationship with the State but end up with more 
benefits than the State itself. 
‘Extractive corruption’, on the other hand, is when the State has the upper hand in the 
relationship. This is often seen in the political framework of various authoritarian States. 
The corrupting group or individual plays a passive role as the State (the corrupted) has the 




The principal causes of Political corruption 
It is a complex task to try and find the reasons behind political corruption. Rose-Ackerman 
(1996) states: “Many officials remain honest in the face of considerable temptation, and others 
accept payoffs that seem small relative to the benefits under their control. Others, however, amass 
fortunes. The level of malfeasance depends not only on the volume of potential benefits, but also on 
the riskiness of corrupt deals and on the participants' moral scruples and bargaining power”.  
Various theories explain the widespread phenomenon of political corruption through 
cultural and moral factors typical of a country. When considering the factors that 
contribute to the onset and spread of corruption,  an important role should be assigned to 
the cultural, ethnic and social framework that fix in the ‘moral’ of a country the 
seriousness of an act of corruption. Cultural norms, that vary from State to State, pose a 
boundary between a gift and a bribe or favoritism: therefore the definition of what is 
corrupt or not is a cultural thing (Rose-Ackerman, 1999) and what can be defined by a 
corrupt external observer can be considered as an acceptable gift within a country. 
However, the economic analysis of the causes and the extent of political corruption cannot 
and must not be limited to cultural factors. In fact, in addition to these, one needs to 
consider structural and institutional (economic and political) aspects that may override 
cultural interpretations (the latter is sometimes used as a way of justifying corrupt 
practices in some countries).  
It is worth noting that the framework or ‘structure’ of the administration and how well the 
institutions of a country work can influence the spread of corruption. For example, in 
Britain where the administrative organization is separate from the political system and the 
political parties were institutionalized at an early stage, there is notably less local political 
corruption. If there is a clear boundary between the two different systems (social and 
political procedures from political and economic ones), it is more difficult for politicians to 
enter into the bureaucratic environment. 
In some countries, the presence of so-called ‘regional brokers’ or different forms of mafia 
has meant that the social order of these States has been weakened. Due to the 
particularistic and fragile financial and administrative network in these countries, the State 
has had to depend on these ‘brokers’ to function locally. 
It is worth mentioning that each State develops in different ways, so it is perhaps incorrect 
to conclude that the infiltration of these groups between the bureaucratic authorities and 
political system is the main cause of political corruption. That said, widespread clientelism 
may indeed be largely to blame for the corruption problem. Della Porta (1997) mentions 
how the links between clientelism and corruption and weak administration structures and 
corrupt practices have becomes ‘vicious circles’ from which it is incredibly difficult to 
break free. 
Another cause of political corruption identified in literature, is government intervention in 
the economy. This intervention creates income managed on a discretionary basis by  
public officials, which in turn can generate corruption. Due to the growth of the welfare 
state and public sector, the political elite now have the monopoly over many financial 
resources.  
It is easier for members of State and private individuals to sidestep rules and regulations 
as decisions are not influenced by the workings of the market but linked to these rules. 
While the focus so far has mainly been on the reasons and opportunities for one to enter 
into corrupt practices, it is also important to look at ‘institutional’ and ‘political’ factors. 
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One significant factor is in what political context the corruption takes place. There is a 
widespread belief that corruption is measured by the level of democracy in a country. The 
more democratic a State, the less corrupt it should be. According to Friedrich (1993) the 
more lawful the country, the less likely corruption will evolve. 
However, in some authoritarian countries, dictators are able to control the extent of 
corruption. In other words he will be able to decide who benefits from the State resources. 
For this reason, in some countries under powerful dictatorships corruption is actually less 
rife. The citizens will consider these States a legitimate entity as they have the power and 
ability to carry out social changes and promote economic production as well as to manage 
law and order. 
Regarding the functioning of political parties, we must consider the different methods of 
financing of political parties, and the funding of elections. In countries such as the USA 
and Japan, this is now becoming a key matter with regards to political corruption. 
Due to the high costs of elections and the political process in general, parties often have to 
look elsewhere for financial resources. They have few funds available and therefore 
attempt to find other means to keep their political status and to appear the most efficient 
in the eyes of the public.  
Another important factor which may lead to political corruption is ‘longevity in power’. 
This term refers to how governments can stay in power without being challenged by other 
rivals. In authoritarian States, the absence of a formal autonomous structure means that 
bureaucrats or public officials can take advantage and use power in corrupt ways. On the 
contrary, in democratic countries public accountability is guaranteed by the institutions of 
the ‘State of law’. If governments believe that their position of power is infallible, many 
begin to confuse the difference between State and government and as a result begin to 
think they are exempt from the laws that apply to everyone else. 
Among the causes of greater or lesser spread of corruption is certainly the control system 
and the extent of the punishment related to corrupt acts. In deciding whether to engage in 
a corrupt transaction, an individual (be they public officials or firms) by comparing the 
expected benefits with the expected cost, decides to be corrupt only if the total benefit is at 
least equal to the total cost. The reforms designed to increase the risk of discovery and the 
extent of the punishment may reduce the demand for and supply of bribes. With regard to 
the likelihood of being discovered, it is often endogenous compared to the level of 
corruption, in that the more widespread the corruption, the lower the risk of being 
denounced. 
Consequences of political corruption 
While most analysts concur that political corruption is morally condemnable, its economic 
and political consequences are less discussed. This is perhaps due to the fact that political 
corruption - complex as a concept – is difficult to both define and measure. 
Corruption, in the past, has even been considered as having a positive role in some 
developing countries. This was the opinion of analysts who were working within the 
scheme of the  ‘modernization theory’ in the 1960s. More precisely, the debate on the 
economic effects of corruption started with the two pioneering works of Leff (1964) and 
Huntington (1968), who said that corruption would stimulate economic growth mainly 




 corruption if ‘speedy money’, can ensure that individuals are able to circumvent 
red tape; 
 if the bureaucrats are paid directly for their work through bribery, this should make 
the bureaucrats work better and faster. 
Therefore corruption is seen as something constructive in promoting economic growth 
and investment as well as helping social development in countries with weak 
bureaucracy, making up for the lack of adequate formal practices. However, these 
statements have been widely opposed by recent literature that says that corruption can 
have positive effects only in limited areas: they refer to the benefits arising from the 
assumption that State intervention creates inefficiency and corruption, shrinking them or 
eliminating them for the best economic growth of the system. Therefore, only in cases 
where the political system is inefficient, may political corruption  be an improvement (see 
della Porta and Vannucci, 1997).  
With the spread of corruption, government costs will increase, public services will no 
longer be guaranteed as resources will begin to dwindle, revenues may be exposed, and it 
will no longer be possible to make effective decisions. Corruption can also have a negative 
influence on the purchase or even production of goods for the public. The whole process 
of purchasing, tendering, giving contracts, the realization of work and payment at the end 
may all be affected. 
A key moment in the political process of a democracy is when one needs to respond to 
public demand. The administration network is faced with the demands and requirements 
of different social groups. The function of political mediation according to Pizzorno (1992), 
is “to identify and interpret the needs and desires of the population; select and generalize those 
which can be expressed in political terms; propose, justify and criticize policies and measures to 
achieve these ends or, when necessary, to explain why they cannot be satisfied”. It is the means 
through which interests are collected and expressed. 
The efficiency of this service is then jeopardized by corruption as the demand becomes 
‘internal’ not ‘public’. Public demand is no longer protected as the formal restrictions of 
the institutions are weakened by corrupters, who are able to make decisions and take the 
profits from corrupt practices creating the disintegration of public demand to satisfy 
specific needs.  
Public spending is often inextricably linked with corruption and clientelism. Public 
officials aim to draw as many resources as possible into their domains of power so they 
can receive payment for mediation as a bribe. In this way, these administrators also try to 
win public support as a consequence of the influence of public investment on 
employment. For this reason, public spending is moved into the areas where there are the 
most benefits from corruption and where there are fewer risks due to the discretional 
characteristics of the practices. Citizen needs are not taken into account when these 
operations and services are carried out and many works remain incomplete or discarded 
altogether. In addition, in the case where politicians are not content with the sum given 
through bribes, public demand often remains unfulfilled. It is worth noting, however, that 
during purchasing transactions, there are competitive rules which means that those 
participating have equal treatment once the cost of public spending has been decided. 
8 
 
In fact, in a widespread corrupt society, it can therefore be expected that those who 
formulate public demand will award the provision of public goods or a ‘cartel’ of all the 
companies participating in tendering. The bids are then able to be correlated and the 
income obtained then redistributed. Politicians or bureaucrats who have been involved in 
corruption in the past will then make sure that these individual companies or group of 
companies will definitely (or most likely) win a tender. 
As a consequence, public demand will then be administered in such a way that these 
‘protected’ companies will have an advantage in promoting their own products and will 
be able to benefit in the future from their ‘special’ connections with politicians. Costs 
become inflated as public tenders are allocated to companies who lack the required 
competences, equipment and qualifications. 
Another element which politicians use to manipulate public demand is when they have 
real (or false) ‘urgent’ interests. Usually the amount of public spending and its 
administration will be relatively high so corrupt politicians need to create a contrived 
emergency. 
Lack of planning expertise of public administration and convoluted bureaucracy slows 
down the time taken to complete public operations, which in turn paves the way for 
corruption as discretionary proceedings in the contracting process become legitimate. 
Corruption therefore creates a redistributive process from which politicians benefit: “A 
corrupt system of government services has the distributional disadvantage of benefiting 
unscrupulous people at the expense of law-abiding citizens who would be willing to purchase the 
services legally” (Rose-Ackerman, 1978). Corruption attributes property rights to agents 
who then breach the rights of public interest and consequently further the tax burden 
which has a detrimental impact on the life of citizens. 
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